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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SYBIL R. BIRCH, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
vs. ] 
ALLEN G. BIRCH, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
The defendant/appellant, 
) Case No. 870457-CA 
1 Priority 14b 
f Allen G. Birch, responds to 
respondent's Brief as follows: 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff apparently sets forth her Statement of the 
Facts on pages 3 through 7 of her Brief. On page 3 she denies 
having talked with Judge Rigtrup, but that denial should have 
been contained in a counter-affidavit in the lower court, not 
in Respondent's Brief. It was not so included in a counter-
affidavit. 
Also on page 3 respondent denies that the house was paid 
with indemnity money. To support that assertion she * attaches a 
savings account exhibit shown for the first time in her Addendum. 
It was not presented in the lower court. It would perhaps not be 
objectionable to show information like that if it were the 
plaintiff who was seeking to show what the evidence in the lower 
court would have been had an evidentiary hearing been granted. It 
is certainly not proper for plaintiff to attempt to put on her 
case for the first time in the appellate court. To be canvassed 
on appeal that exhibit would have to have been presented to the 
lower court. It was not. 
The same is true of most of the statement of facts of 
respondent. She filed but one affidavit in the lower court, and 
that is found at page 314 of the record. It does not address most 
of the supposed factual assertions which plaintiff so liberally 
sprinkles thoughout her Brief. These alleged facts , to the 
extent they have no basis in the record, should not be considered 
as facts on appeal. 
Such factual assertions not founded in the record do 
perhaps illustrate the factual issues that should have been dealt 
with in an evidentiary hearing at the trial court level. It is 
the position of defendant that the Stipulation and Decree should 
be vacated and an evidentiary hearing conducted in the lower court 
to resolve the many disputed issues of fact existing bewteen the 
parties and noted by plaintiff in her Brief. 
Plaintiff asserts at page 2 of her Brief that there were 
$110,000 of assets in the marriage and that she got $9,000 plus 
the $23,000 (which is the subject of this appeal) for a total of 
$32,000. If indeed no assets have been acquired with indemnity 
money, and if indeed all of the property is marital property, and 
if it amounts to $110,000, one would suppose that plaintiff would 
welcome a full evidentiary hearing in order to get a full $55,000 
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o f t h e ma ri t a1 e s t a t e, ra t her t han j ust ac cep t the $ 3 2
 f 0 0 0 she is 
defending on appeal. In fact p] a i nt i ff appe a rs con£Ident 11 Iat sI: ie 
w I ] 1 ci o b e t t e r i f t h e r e I s a £ i:i 11 e v i d e n 11 a i: y h ear I n g , A t p a g e 1 ] 
of her Brief she states, "I am sure a fu 11 evidentiary (hearing) 
would have been to my benefi t " 
That i s all the defendant asks is to have his day in 
court to prese<~- * ne facts and have .* \ .. nbiased judge hear -hose-
facts and ~ -; ''< r i deci si on » 
. ..: \ rjrniore, the ... ^  ..:..: : . n error. The down 
payment was - ict made as alleged by defendant, and trie deposit 
of $25,55? ^ef-rred to by tlir -nel ] a lit: was made i ip as c allows: 
^balance of New Mexico indemnity award of 
$28 r873.25 after deducting $9,572.13 to appl. 3-
a down payment on the house paid at closing, TV-
other $500 was paid from Earnest Money deposit. 
The contract and down payment checks are attached 
:\d d e n d u m h e r e t o ) 
Proceeds from sale of mobile home. 
Sale of power generator and related equipment 
Checking account fands transferred :rom N ^ W 
Mexico settlement 
Personal injury benefics from Jelco $300 per wee*. 
times 8 weeks 
rlhio is cm approximate reconstruction oi the 
deposit which is shown \-\ the Addendum heretor 
together with the cashiers check transferinc 
said funds from New Mexico to Utah.) 
amour' , v; * r^arawr r r jin \W^ Darties* Dan-, 5 .buquerque ^ r;0 
d e p o s i t e d ^- *^ ~.-.: - •  ^„ • „ .* ^n i w^c: ^PenP^ lS 
Appellate Cour t , but these documents are set '"ortJ~ i n opposition 
4,UUt„JU 
750,00 
3,000.1 mi 
2,400.00 
$29,450.00 
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to plaintiff's assertion and to demonstrate to the Court that if 
an evidentiary hearing were granted, there is substantial evidence 
in support of defendant's position. 
On page 4 plaintiff asserts that the money received from 
Jelco of approximately $113,000 was not a gift, but rather was 
compensation income. In our original Brief we acknowledge that 
the amount was treated by Jelco as a payment to the defendant, and 
the parties did indeed include it in their income tax return. It 
was nevertheless a voluntary payment, and in that sense was indeed 
a gift. The William Kibbee Affidavit (R.290) states clearly: 
M3. The above amount (referring to $113,000 
mentioned in the prior paragraph) included voluntary 
weekly payments plus a JELCO, INC., profit sharing plan. 
This volunatarily paid plan ($8,400) and was not in any 
way based on Allen Birch's earnings prior to the 
accident, nor were we legally obligated to make any of 
these. 
"4. The above amount ($113,000.00+) was personal 
injury compestation to our employee." (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff sets forth on page 4 her recollection of the 
meeting with the judge on January 21, 1986, but here again those 
matters should have been included in an affidavit in the lower 
court. 
On pages 4 and 5 of her Brief plaintiff disputes that in 
the Court's computations the Court determined that at least 
$10,000 of the house did come from indemnity money and was to be 
doubled for inflation, giving defendant no less than the $20,000 
equity in the home. Plaintiff states she was not present when 
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that was discussed. As noted, that denial should have been 
included i~ :~ -ffidi^i* + -• s "ais^ *^  'ic* •*' 
Judge had .-t-ar.pd e a r n e r *-"a* wts entitled to keep my medical 
indemnity ^onf -.«-... earing c ^h^ -^'ir- confirms 
Appellant'- Bri^t. pages . <> *»M- , ^ ^.exro settlement of 
made Jar.
 Aar\ i 4 / ?-s -inr: • : «- ; •, ?r - - rearing tooK piac- ^ 
January !Q,Wt- a l e v e n ^ear^ la^^r "^ '^'icp was p,,rr,has^d ~--r 
" v i r P 'lancial Declaration-- as be.r. .; wor*n $59 si defendant) 
ol $60,000 < Ol ^  ' -* i — W 4 : 
i 
eleven years, =>o *-o-~ ii^ * -w- value or t ,e aown payment. -ience 
defendant was, ^v^n accord ipq f o ludg^ Riqt-r-.*Vs reason: "*n
 f Lu 
; * ~^ i . : e 
judge then determined m a t ^he remaining equity ; i^  \ w- of 
approximatp v S4i ,va - 4. O P divided, this because : ludae 
u„ a ; uiiip r:-uiu DI-L t lerrit-;
 A.ater determine! ioi. * :iat 
the Court prred, 
the hearir.^ aefendan .indert. U O K r .) s-j to* ion • u*-- snaotj.ru-ji\ no 
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obtain the loan, and in connection therewith that plaintiff 
forwarded a Quit-claim Deed to the property to him which was in 
fact recorded. The defendant's decision to seek to vacate the 
Decree of Divorce occurred thereafter and has been in process ever 
since. The Decree of Divorce of course constituted a lien against 
the property until vacated, and that notwithstanding the Quit-
claim Deed, and still constitutes a lien against the property. 
Plaintiff has in no way been injured by that occurrence, nor has 
defendant attempted to take advantage thereof. The house has been 
set aside as a supersedeas bond on this appeal, and the plaintiff 
is fully secured for whatever determination the Court may make 
with respect to a division of the house. 
At page 2 of her Brief plaintiff alleges that the total 
estate was $110,000; however, at page 6 she appears to agree with 
the defendant's figures as to the amount of the €>state at the time 
of the commencement of this action as being approximately $41,300, 
not including the house. She then argues that she didn't get half 
the $41,300. The fact of the matter is, however, that on or about 
June 9, 1983, the plaintiff came to the defendant and told him 
that she was leaving, went down the basement and took the silver 
(amounting to $6,000), and as she left, told the defendant he 
could have what was left. The plaintiff also took a car worth 
$2,250, her A. G. Edwards account, which actually had approxi-
mately $3,000 in it at the time, a diamond ring worth $1,500. 
She was later awarded $2,000 by Commissioner Peuler from a 
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n o t e d ' i n i t i a l B r i e f ""~ " s a p p e l l a n t ' s 
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a p p e l l a n t --^s CM'"en /* r.umber o- e x a m p l e s of - u a s wmct i - •.. . r~^d 
-»f •- £> r- j u d c'" n ^ ** " ^ 1 x ' r ^  rd *=* r 0 ° n v i n Q d *-- f & nd a n t -. Mi - » f o r 
• . - Coi ii: t t h a t . 
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constitutes - -»-1d i r i -na l around ni --rror aside from his conduct 
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- - f . 
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reference to defendant's investment activities as "dabbling" are 
all indications of bias which occurred after the disqualification 
hearing and are acts complained of by defendant in his initial 
Brief herein and timely brought before this Court. The argument 
on pages 27 to 2 9 of the Brief make amply clear that defendant 
complains of Judge Rigtrup's bias on both occasions. Even if the 
Court should feel that timely appeal was not made from Judge 
Daniels1 Order, the bias of Judge Rigtrup after that hearing ha& 
been properly brought before the Court as error on this appeal. 
It should also be noted that at the hearing on August 17 
the Court apparently had not even read the Affidavits of the 
defendant (R.395, p.4), suggesting that he had already made up his 
mind. 
POINT II. THE HOUSE WAS PAID FOR WITH INDEMNITY MONEY. 
As noted in Appellant's Brief, the house was 
substantially paid for in full with money received by reason of 
defendant's accidentf which money was intended as compensation for 
the destruction of his body, and therefore ought to be considered 
as his separate property, and the house purchased with it ought 
also to be considered such. 
The only assertion which plaintiff appears to make 
against that fact is the bald assertion that it was not so paid, 
but this is not supported by any credible evidence. Plaintiff 
attempted to point out that the initial down payment was paid 
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before the indemnity money was received, but that is not the fact. 
The original indemnity money of $28,873.25 was indeed received 
prior to March of 1975, notwithstanding plaintiff's assertion to 
the contrary. From that amount $9,572.13 was used to buy the home 
(together with $500 Earnest Money deposit). This left $19,300, 
and that, together with other moneys as heretofore noted, were 
added together, and the entire amount brought from New Mexico in 
the form of a cashier's check deposited in Salt Lake City in the 
total amount of $29,557.66. 
POINT III. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE GRANTED RELIEF FROM THE 
STIPULATION AND DECREE. 
In Point III of Respondent's Brief she sets forth no 
defenses to this point other than to simply concede that defendant 
was severely handicapped as contended, and that he is still 
handicapped, and therefore there is no change of circumstance. 
Defendant's objection to the Stipulation and the Decree based 
thereon is not that there has been a change of circumstances 
between that time and the present, but rather that the Stipulation 
was improvident for a severely-handicapped person at that time, is 
still so improvident, and that it was entered into through duress. 
Even plaintiff admits, at page 2 of her Brief, that defendant is 
"a very sick man." Plaintiff does not really address the points 
raised by defendant under this point, and therefore no further 
response would appear to be required. 
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POINT IV. THE STIPULATION AND DECREE SHOULD BE VACATED 
FOR FRAUD. 
In Point IV of plaintiff's Brief she discusses the 
matter of setting aside the Decree of Divorce for fraud complained 
of by defendant in his Point IV. On pages 8 and 9 of her Brief 
plaintiff admits that she was sending the child support money to 
New Mexico. She there asserts for the first time that she had it 
sent to her in Utah while she was living with defendant, but the 
defendant nevertheless in his affidavit has asserted that the 
parties were supported entirely by his income (R.284), not from 
any of that money. The plaintiff's assertion that the money sent 
to New Mexico was somehow used for family purposes here in Utah 
ought to have been included in an affidavit in the lower court, 
and there should have been an evidentiary hearing on that matter. 
The only evidence which this Court can consider in that regard is 
that the money was sent to New Mexico and was not used for family 
purposes, but rather saved up by plaintiff or spent for her own 
purposes, as the child was being supported by defendant. 
The plaintiff's assertions with regard to her employment 
on page 9 likewise should have been included in an affidavit on 
lower court, and those assertions are therefore not competent to 
be considered at this time. Even so, the plaintiff does not 
satisfactorily answer the discrepancy between her income on the 
W-2 of $1,837 per month as opposed to the $1,400 which she showed 
on her financial declaration in the divorce proceedings. This 
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amounts to a discrepancy of $437 per month or $5,244 per year, and 
the disposition of this money is a legitimate issue. 
POINT V. AT THE VERY LEAST DEFENDANT SHOULD BE 
AWARDED THE FIRST $20,000 FOR THE HOUSE AND AT LEAST ONE-HALF 
OF THE REMAINDER. 
Respondent asserts at page 5 of her Brief that there was 
no determination by the Court to award defendant $20,000 "off the 
top." The plaintiff is in error, and we have discussed that 
matter at page 5 of this Brief. 
Plaintiff, it appears, should have no serious objection 
to a full evidentiary hearing, stating at page 11 of her Brief: 
"I am sure a full evidentiary (hearing) would have been to my 
benefit." Also on page 11 the plaintiff asks that she be awarded 
the home and that defendant be allowed to live in it for a 
reasonable time. Plaintiff points out that " . . . if Allen had 
been paying a modest rent of $250 a month it would add up to 
$15,000 in five years." This suggestion, although clearly 
excessive, is similar to an alternative suggested in Appellant's 
Brief that if the Court feels that plaintiff is entitled to any 
distribution relating to the house, the amount the defendant is 
required to pay the plaintiff be paid directly to the plaintiff, 
without interest, without the necessity of a bank loan, which 
would imperil defendant's equity and subject him to the danger of 
a foreclosure. The other possibility suggested, by the plaintiff's 
own assertion is that the defendant should be allowed to live in 
-11-
the home for a period of time before any distribution. If 
defendant were allowed to live in the home for life, then the home 
could be sold upon his death and an equitable amount distributed 
to the plaintiff. 
POINT VI. DEFENDANT'S EDUCATION IS NOT A MARITAL ASSET. 
On page 12 of her Brief the plaintiff asserts that the 
defendant's engineering decree is an asset. That is not the law, 
but in this case, where the defendant is unable to work, his 
engineering degree is not an asset and is not an item that can 
or should be taken into consideration in a property settlement 
between the parties. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's implication in bringing this 
matter up is misleading. The parties were married in June of 
1968, and the defendant graduated from the University of New 
Mexico in December of 1972. Of the 54 months in this period 
defendant went to school 30 months and worked 24 months. While 
attending school defendant always worked part time, and for 24 of 
the 30 months that he was in school, he was on scholarship, which 
paid full tuition and books. During the 24 months that defendant 
was not in school he worked construction jobs in various parts of 
the country, never working less than 70 hours a w.eek. When 
plaintiff and defendant were married, the plaintiff brought with 
her a daughter by a previous marriage, who never received any 
child support from her father and, although the plaintiff did work 
during the school years, the principal support for plaintiff, 
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defendant and the child of the first marriagef even during that 
period of timef came from the defendant. 
Defendant is unable to ascertain what plaintiff means 
by a "construction option." Although defendant did specialize in 
construction in school, that specialty did not require an extra 
year. 
Here again these matters were not brought out in the 
court below and are asserted at this point to rebut plaintiff's 
assertions and to demonstrate that factual issue is present for 
evidentiary hearing in the court below. 
Plaintiff makes assertions on pages 12 and 13 with 
respect to defendant's conduct during the marriage which are not 
only irrelevant, but not proper to be asserted at this time on 
appeal. 
However, as plaintiff raises the issue, the fact of the 
matter is that the plaintiff left the defendant because she did 
not want to be restricted by marriage to a paraplegic. Such a 
life was too confining for her, and she wanted her freedom. At 
page 13 of her Brief plaintiff rightly identifies defendant's 
feelings of anger and frustration over his accident. But more 
than that, it has not been easy for defendant to have his life's 
companion leave him with his broken body and to see her take up 
her life with another man. To compound his frustrations, he has 
only seen his daughter one day in 5 years, as plaintiff and 
daughter live in New Mexico and, although the mother has been to 
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Utah a number of times since the divorce, she has never brought 
the daughter to see defendant except one time. 
Defendant is alone and abandoned by his family. These 
are frustrations indeed. Defendant has learned to cope with these 
disappointments; at least he is doing his best. 
Plaintiff's claim that she left because of physical 
abuse is false. There was one episode: On June 6, 1983, 
plaintiff's daughter by her first marriage, who was then 23 years 
of age, was in the home watching a video which had obscene 
language and to which the defendant objected because his own 
daughter and other small children were in the house. When 
plaintiff's daughter by her first marriage refused to turn off the 
television, the defendant went over and turned the television off, 
at which time the stepdaughter screamed loudly and brought the 
plaintiff into the room from upstairs, where she had been taking a 
nap. Plaintiff used vile and unfitting language at, and 
physically attacked defendant, attempting to strike him while he 
was standing on a crutch, using his leg braces. He grabbed the 
plaintiff by the collar and held her at a distance from him so 
that her attempts to strike him and kick him were futile. While 
being thus held, the plaintiff reached onto a table, picked up a 
two-pound carton of cottage cheese, threw it and hit defendant 
directly in the face with it. In response defendant's hand went 
from plaintiff's collar to her eye. This occurred so rapidly that 
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the defendant believes it was a reflex. Thereforef this "physical 
abuse" was nothing more than a reflex attempt at self-defense. 
That episode did not make it impossible for plaintiff to 
stay in the marriage. It was at best the excuse she was looking 
for to leave defendant and seek her freedom away from a household 
encumbered by paraplegia. 
It should further be noted that the defendant, as a 
paraplegic, is in no position to take any kind of a battle to 
anyone. If there is going to be a battle, someone has to bring 
it to him. 
One would think that plaintiff would at least feel 
sufficient compassion for her former spouse and the father of her 
daughter to want to see him able to live in a home adapted to his 
needs, even if she chooses not to live with him. 
Defendant likewise objects to the itemization of 
attorney's fees set forth on page 13 as not a proper matter to be 
raised in plaintiff's Brief, nor to be considered by this Court. 
The defendant has likewise had substantial expenses, and in fact 
his living expenses, legal expenses and medical expenses have 
totally eliminated all stocks, bonds and savings which he formerly 
had, and defendant is totally impoverished except for his Social 
Security, whatever interest he has in the home and some modest 
household furnishings and a modest 1976 Oldsmobile automobile 
which is specially adapted to his needs so that he can get around 
and be somewhat independent. 
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On page 14 the plaintiff quotes from the transcript 
of Judge Daniels. The statement by Judge Daniels is totally 
irrelevant and erroneous. The matter before Judge Daniels was 
the bias or non-bias of Judge Rigtrup, and Judge Daniels was not 
hearing the matter of setting aside the Decree for fraud. Further-
more, Judge Daniels' undertanding of the law is not correct if he 
is asserting that a stipulation in a divorce case solely involves 
the law of contract. Any divorce case, whether resolved by 
stipulation or trial, involves to a substantial and inescapable 
degree the equities as they exist between the parties. Stipu-
lations are subject to approval of the court, and parties cannot 
by stipulation remove the court from its role as the final 
arbitrator of the equities as they exist between the parties. 
At page 1 of her Addendum the plaintiff asserts that the 
$1,717 was for the sale of a pickup. That amount was not from the 
sale of a pickup truck, but rather was an income tax refund for 
1974 as shown on the form 1040 included in the Addendum hereto. 
Defendant does desire to point out, however, that the so-
called savings account shown in the appendix to plaintiff's Brief 
is an account into which only defendant's money was deposited. 
Any money coming, to the plaintiff was kept in a totally separate 
account and used by her for her own purposes. 
The defendant respectfully moves that the financial 
records set forth in the plaintiff's Addendum be stricken and/or 
ignored by the Court, together with the definition of "part-time 
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employee" shown in the Addendum, together with all of the 
"evidentiary assertions" made by the plaintiff throughout her 
Brief which were not set forth by affidavit or otherwise in the 
lower court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons we respectfully pray that the 
relief requested by defendant in his Appellant's Brief herein be 
granted* 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed four copies of the foregoing Brief to plaintiff/ 
respondent, Sybil R. Brooks, at her address: 6036 Appelton Road 
SW, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87105, postage prepaid, the day 
of April, 1988. 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
- 1 8 -
btfJWl* 
6036 Appleton Road SW 
AGREEMENT Albuquerque, New Mexico 8^105 
AND NOTICE OF CONTRACT 
The undersigned hereby acknowledge and agree that pursuant to 
the terms of that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract of like date hereof] 
the undersigned, GLENN A. JOHNSON and ESTELLA D# JOHNSON, his wif<| 
have sold, and the undersigned, ALLAN G. BIRCH and SYBIL R« BIRCH, 
his wife, as joint tenants, with full rights of survivorship and not a#-
tenants in common, has purchased that certain real property situate in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and described as follows:-
v 
/ , % 
All of Lot 32, TAYLORSVILLE GARDENS NO. 1, according 
to the official plat thereof recorded in the office of the] 
County Recorder of said County. 
~}' The undersigned do further agree that there is an unpaid bal-
ance owing under said Uniform Real Estate Contract in the amount of 
$ 22,000. 00 which amount of said ALLAN G. BIRCH and SYBIL R. BIRCH, 
his wife, agree to pay, and the said GLE^NN A. JOHNSON and ESTELLA D\ 
JOHNSON, his wife, agree to accept as provided in and subject to the 
terms of said contract. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our hands suuj 
seals this day of January 
Recorded 
Request 
.JAW301975 flj^ . «>™--~ 
KATIE L DIXON, Recorder l^J 
U Sali Lake County, Utah , 
9 ^W By "tPrfiftk &Us^~£mli &%^ (2, /*LL*/ 
h ^93-**r-r • 
Allan G. Birch 
^^^y /f $<^^& 
Sybil 41. Birch 
/ ' % ^jTiSSTATE OF UTAH 
'*'
 >
-"' •-J ^:;UBOUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the/^^day of January, 1975, personally appeared before 
I^httrc 'Glenn A. JLohnson and Estella D. Johnson, his wife, the signers of the 
\\ foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the 
j isteme, 
I My commission expires: J^^M^f/^ /97f Residing at:^j^ 
y^7 /s /7 s /?* 
tmS-
\ 
•Pi, 
/ 
9
 f\ 
\ . 
OF NEW MEXICO 
, - »\*^Y\ On the /JT day of January, 1975, personally appeared before 
meJIflSaSiG, Birch and Sybil R. Birch, his wife, the signers of the fore-
giinj*/ i£*'Ijjhiment, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the samel, 
My ..commission expires; ^ ^
 0 ^ ?<- Residing at^, f f f O^M^^^J 
Notary Public 
y^^L. 
Co 
Co 
Co 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
^ 
1 THIS AGREFMENT, made m duplicate this day of . T n m i a r y
 mi A D , 19.25—, 
by and botv^ tn GLENN A. JOHNSON and ESTEI,T,A D, JOHNSON^ his wifV» 
hereinafter designate I as th, Sellei an J M J L A N ft- B T R C H a n d SYT^TT, R t T U R H H , hi R W l f ^ 
as lomt tenants*, with full rights of aurvwotship nnri not ns tnnnntR in pnmmnnf 
hereinafter designated a* the Buy r of . 
r 
2 WITNESSETH That the Seller foi the consideration heiein mentioned agrees to sell and com »y to the buyer, 
and the buyei for tU cons dciition k u i n mentioned apices to puuhasc the following: desenbtd real property, situate in 
the county
 0fSalt Lake state of Utah to wit 2122 West Lindsay, Salt Lake City, Ut. 
AOCRESS 
More particulaily described is follows 
All of Lot 32, TAYLORSVILLE GARDENS NO, 1, according to the official plat 
thereof recorded in the office of the Coitnty Recorder of said County. 
(Together with Refrigerator, Carpet, Drapes, Food F r e e z e r . ) 
Subject to easements, restr ict ions and right of ways appearing of record. 
3 Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of T H I R T Y 
T W O T H O U S A N D znd NO/lCM-*.- - - Dollars <j 3 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ? 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order • • — - - - — • - - - — - • — - - - - - - — . - • . » • - — .->»•»-- - , - « . -
stnetly withm the following times to wit TEN THOUSAND and NO/100 - - - ,j 10.000.00
 } 
cash the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 2 2 x j 0 0 t 0 0 shall be paid as follows 
^$250.00 or more on the 1st. day of April , 1975 and $250.00 or more on the 1st. 
day of each and every month thereafter until entire Sel ler 's equity, together with 
interest on the contract balance, is paid m full.^ 
It is understood and agreed that said monthly payments shall include general 
property taxes and hazard insurance premiums, said taxes and insurance p r e -
miums to be paid by the Seller when due and added to the contract balance. 
In the event the annual property taxes or fire insurance premiums increase, the 
monthly payment hereof shall thereafter be increased by 1/12 ol the said annual 
increase in taxes and 1/12 of a one vear increase in fire insurance o r e m m m 
Possesbion of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the Lbl. day of ^ y i a r c h
 t in 7 5 , 
4 Said monthly payments aie to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal Inteiest sh-U be chaiged fiom M a r c h 1, 1 9 7 5 _
 o n aj] unpaid portions of the 
purchase price ut the late o f — L i g h t per cent ( Q r() p e r annum The Buyer at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payment* upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any moitgage 
or contract b} the Buyei heicm assumed such excess to be applied cither to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyei which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made 
5 It s understood and agiccd that if tin Sellei accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to tne terms heiein mentioi e i th n by o domp it will in no w iv altci the turns of the cont act as to the forfeiture 
hcreinaft i stipulated oi as to iny other lemedies of the seller 
6 It s undu stood that theic picsertly exists an obligation against said property in favor of Z l Q f l S F i r s t 
N a t i o n a l B a n k with an unpaid balance of 
? 7 t377 51 % lb of January 1. 1975 r , 
" Sel'er represents th it thuc are no unpai 1 special improvement distnct taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the piocess of Icing installed, or which have been completed and not paid for outstanding against said prop-
erty except the following n o e x c e p t i o n s ^ 
8 The Seller is given the o| tion to secure execute and maintain loans seemed by said prop< rty of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder healing interest at the rate of not to exceed . ^ ^ S M ? percent 
( " r<) per annum and payable m legulai monthly installments piovided that the agrregate monthly installment 
payments required \o be made bv Sellei on said lo vns shall not be greatei than each installment payment required to be 
made by *he Buvet under this eontiaet When the pwcipal due heieunder has been reduced to ne amount ot any such 
loan* and moi tgages O t Sellei agtees to u n v i y and the Buyer agtees to accept title to the arove described property 
subject o said oans and moitgic.es 
() If the Ru\ r k ir<s to i\( m s r his njrht through accelerated navm nts jr lor this "T«am' i ' i* tf pey of* nny ob1— 
gatiors ouUtanc ng at date of this ag ieumnt against said property it shall be the Buyers obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty wmch may be required on prepayment of sail pr or jbhg"tions Prepayment penaltus in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall b» paid by seller unless 
sa u obligations are assumed or approved by buyer 
10 Tne Buyer ag*- es upon wnttcn request of the Seller to make application to a ichable lendir for a loan of such 
amount as tan be secured under the rcgulatioiu^of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchas price above mentioned and to ef*r t the papers requited uid i uv one half the exjenscs necessary in ob-
*aimnf sau x an the Sella agreeing to pay the other one half provided howevu that the monthly pa_,nunts and 
nures* ratP required ^nail not exceed *hc monthly pay nents and mtciest lute as outlined above 
11 ^he "*i^ r agrees to pay ill tuxes and assessments of ev«.ry kir d and n iture which are or which may be assessed 
titd wh 1 { jj jtcome due on th j r*.mists during the life of tl i a j , m m i n l The ^ Her hereby covenants and agi ta 
t u at the > c.n 0 ° sch men s aK unst said premises except the following / 
SLibjct l.o ,m> n.s.spssmunt^af c.iiung ^taxL-Mjuz&^rM125.^iJMai of Taylatjaville-
R^jmion , Imprnvement P i s Lttic-t-
 c r 4 
The Seller further covenants ind igrees that he will not default in the payment of his ol ligations against sail proputy 
FORM I06—UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT—KELLY CO 33 w N I N T H SOUTH S u C UTAH 
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT 
FILE 3366 
LaMar Staker, Inc., Realtor 
Real Estate Co. 
3UYEK ..Al)i&.G*.3ix:ch.axiASybiL.&..JZxzciL ,—,DATE J^ U&IX*LJ19JJI, 
WERTY A D D W ^ J S ^ 
JELLERS NAME Glej3n.A*...ajld.-Eatella.D*..J.QhnjSQn, POSSESSION DATE 
<>uw»#« 
rf »«»**9*- ^ ^ . ^ » . . . . . ^ . , . . . . ^ ^ 
'" '" i j i1"'^"" 
Crests' ITEMS Exp< 
Purchase Price 32;,Q0Q- & 
Insurance Premium Unexpired B u y e r t o obta in own i n s u r a n c e 
Insurance Premium toaatpnot New policy (Transamerica Ins. Co. V M. m x* XX 
New Insurance Policy for XX 
Reserves: 
* * ^ 
XX XX 
Attorney's Opinioo XX XX 
Closing Fee 31 00 XX xx> 
Recording Notice of Contract m. xx: XX 
mom>"»fii' 
Deposit to LaMar Staker. Inc.. Realtor MX ,XiU*i 
Mortgage Balance Assumed by Buyers at: xx XX 
Mortgage Balance Assumed by Buyers at: xx XX 
Contract Balance Assumed M a r c h 1, 1 9 7 5 xx XX mm SXL 
Interest Due and Assumed at: xx XX 
Interest Due and Assumed at: XX XX 
Taxes Assumed by Buyer to: M a r c h L 1 9 7 5 ( b a s e d Ol 1 9 7 4 t a x e s 
& sra 
XX XX 45 3 1 
All Util. to be Read & Paid by Seller xx XX 
To date of Possession 
Mortgage Assumption Fee 
Sewer and water shall be paid to date of possession by Seller 
T 1 "#ipNp J 
Total ttMl 20. 
Balance 
B2» ffi 2L 
Balancing Totals VuAll 
9,572 13 
& 33»,ffl 
Remarks: 
a 
Accepted: 
«•« »•* •• M O * »•**««. *"*•*»? #•*• •*»«>« t *«»»» •••?» *• ••»«•* »*• «*.«.** •»•* 
GARY A. WESTON 
Attorney at Law 
533 South 2nd East 328-9782 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HfH«UlM.*H«HtltW.M«Mf»l>««W»«t«1^«M( 
J 
J 
PURCHASER'S RECEIPT 
Adobe Acres Office 
The First National Bank in Albuquerque 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 
9S-27 
1070 
D A T E 4m u f im 
PAYEE SAW A. vestas * racsrieoSr 
12721 
S V 
i lWVS m, 
AlUS C, 331® 
CASHIER'S CHECK 
:llf:||7I!^iiil3f» 
FOR-
CUSTOMER'S MEMO: 
^ , -
TELLER 
NON-KrEBOTJABLE 
Qmht o*d c i »tfc#* ***** t*mm4 im a**€**m or d*»o»* 
OATS 
_J?r/iT **Zi£ 
&**-*Ci v.jxji ir VL3**6C«« 
O€**0Si~ f O * 
1HJ AG-30 W 
T%r*TtOUWT Of 
*
v? v«2r '~ 
•T--.4 
ADDRESS 
TOTAL 
^ 5 6 
* « * * »e v » »* 
The First National BafVk in Albuquerque 
Albuquerque N M 
,* • •* ' 
nnsT * A T \ Br r : a r> c \ cr c 
,-•, 
C A S H I E R ' S C H E C K 
s., 14158 
DOLLAR** 
* U • r» ' • * • ' i : - T -, <J . O 
i I M i J ; , j
 tfW,<&• Individual InpomQ Tax ReturnV;' UWl*fr 
fdt it&~t~°f J4<ui«y 1-Otcomt>#f 31. 19/A, or other tax oh* year wstamng'j .1 .^ JJ.V«£«._.» 1974 ending JU*' 19 
m»m i i i , -*» i JI • •————— w i n i i i» I,
 m+m+mmm*mmmHmmHm*k*v n 11 t i 'M tui'ii • i » n > n n u m i • • m i HI 
I* L 2.1.22^- W&LT.-J^M&SAy.! „,hl„ L-K — 
fv | / . « . - » K.« jnct. Mjr».d zifuoJ. *TUU(/lab«l within UioU 
( £Vnt i»*«r C,ry , U ff l i / . ^ M * ? nting Status (check only one) 
ln;j | jmt return u^ven »t omy one hau income) 
jng sopdf ttety. If spouse is also filing give 
Dal secunty number in designated spec* a&i*p 
l<fd Ol Huuteuuld <*•• tnitr«*tto<tt on f * f t I ) 
Bth dtptnuent child (Ytar spous* ditUK 19 ) 
COUNTY OF 
RESIDENCE 
Your cociat \<*vunty number 
Spouse'^ s»oc««ii security nu . 
pition | spouse's *• *> - u > a ' 
*\t • ic> 
, - i Ent«r 
I J n u n b e r 
of uo*«S 
c h t c k t d p* 
EyotnptlOHS Regular / 65 or over / Blind 
6a Yourself
 v . . % . jfcfl Q ( 1 
b Spou$« • ' • • * • i{gj ' " Q LI * 
c firs\ nameaof'your dependent children, who iive*-1 wth 
you . ' ^ S h \ } l f t • , T •• * : 
— ^ j ^ A ^ t ^ i ^ 4 ^ ^ — ' ^ — — 
•"' * « — r ^ — f o f ^ t ' t 
d Number of other dependents/ijpnv 
7 Total exemptions caimed 
bctiof^  k . Do you yisb.tytftttoiace SV^jMfowt feM$;4ft&<V* 
pk . . " P If •oint return/doe$ your spouse *rish to designate flTV . , 
- r ? ^ r 
Isaurus, tips, and other employee compensation 
Lx 
UL 
- yuwr >*\ v f«-4ucr yaur r u id 
^ . 
"-(Altec* Termi W-tMMi>-^.li V A ' . / , p ^ * 
A «bu, ttt tmuae«o«* >^ M^« 3-p» / / * >. >* t ^ y 
t« »»tt/Mcti9«a \ _ ^ « * * i . . ' i t * » ? » J ^ 
fH*t 6 trd tiJS . 10b Less exclusion ! ' , . _ _ , M i o w •r 
»<inu other alsUtbuttons are over $400, //sr in r^H i or Sch^iu/e &.} 
/ I f * )«tt/WCtl A« 
S1 lndS\o.n [.v.dfends 
t income. T , f * 4 ^ ° o r ,C3Si e n l e r total without listing in Schedule Q l 
LH over S4Q0, enter tota| and list in Hart 11 cj* Schedule B j ^ 
le other than wrige*, dividends, and interest (from Ijno 3 3 ) } . . 9 m*%\\ 
l[add lines 9, IQc, 11, and 12) * . . " , . , 
Jments to mcoTic (such «is "sick pay," movijig expenses, etc. from hne'43) . 
ct line 14 from line 13 (adjusted gross income) 
IOC 
13; 
14 
15 
KSSLUL22.. 
$,- > 
^ * 
«
v
, ' 
. / .<r.6.V^". 
lemize deductions and line 15 is under $10,000, find tax In Tables and enter on line 16. 
Reductions or line 15 is $10,000 or more, go to line 44 to figure tax. 
it unejwed income and can be cioimed 3^  a iiept' ent un your patent s return, check here • Q and ^ e instructions on pa^ e 1 
btck if from Trtx Tables 1 -12 ! y 
Schedule 0 
Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or I 
Schedule G OR Form 4726 
r3dits (from line 54^ . 
Ux (suDtract hnf* 17 from fine 16) 
axes (fjpm hne 61 ) 
d«j lines 18 and 19) 
|i*'fer J! income tfix withheld (attncli Forms I 
VV-2P 1 i front) |_21o 
'imLtej tax (jdyiiLnts (include amount j 
A 2 9. 
iV, credit from 1 J / 3 return) 
h-\ ^aid w *h Fori'! 4c68, Application fur Autonntic 1 
ul TIITH to file U .> Inaiwidiiat Income Tax Return I c_ 
.ymi»nts (fiom l-ne 6b> | d 
dd hnet. Ala, b. c, and a) 
C is ia«xer than line 22, enter BALANCE DUE IRS 
* • I i f l u P i & J l O For n ' * . 10»-,
 t,r
 rt»t«mt»>» rs «t'«j<l v.l i>te in»>liucuot on i>ag« / ) 
2 is larjcr than »ine 20, enter amount OVERPAID 
of Ine ?% to be REFUNDED TO YOU 
ot I,re 24 to be cr.id | j j 
1975 e*timatec< t^x • j 26 1 
24 
25 
\ ' If all of overpay 
16 
17 
18 
19 
X£JL^\=-
^JL9JZ -xl 
% Pay amount on line 23 '' 
\//'/,\n full witn this return. <-; 
^^Wnte social security >> 
^ number on check or 
^ money order and make - ^ 
is, paydble to Internal / 
i^>' Revenue Service. '^ 
22 ^^79 
23 
X7./7 1-
/ 7/7 — 
,. _ „ _ - . , ' f M t (hn -J) i> t i ^e " ^ 
t itfunded (lin« 25 \ nuke no untiy un IHK ?I» >% 
>4 * »"<*•' i-.j- i . u i e fty I »u^ij **riinme<l t*ni retu( . mcluu ut, awCi>.up4n/tn^ wl'«- ' «^ * " J -late nenU ami to i »« t>* * o. ^ > know ^<- 4 u -*. Iict 
$yv< Ufccl»*4r.jn oLpr«iJifer ( o tW lhan taxpayer) u tja»nJ on *.l ,ntotir*tu , el ^h t 1 h- has iny knowlwi^e 
Oate 
pie (if filing luinlly. BOTff must Jlgn nan it orly one hid mcoinc) 
-4//&/?&'' 
ttftJffiH 
. M 
• y£Bti3UgBQafe,T^^y's,0RS 
"l02OTijeras, N. E. - Suite G 
Kh .?_ 
